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I.

INTRODUCTION
This article examines an infrequently considered question in the
literature about federal jurisdiction: whether Congress is subject to any
constitutional constraint when it consents to being sued in federal court.
Even assuming that the sovereign’s consent is a necessary condition to
suit in federal court, this article argues that the waiver of immunity cannot
confer jurisdiction in a manner or through a process that circumvents
constitutional requirements. This question, narrow but important, has not
received sustained attention in the otherwise voluminous literature on
Congress’s power to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts.1 Most
discussion engages with the problem of whether Congress can strip the
courts of jurisdiction to hear particular kinds of claims or, having
conferred jurisdiction, to withhold power to issue specific remedies.2 A
small sub-set of the literature distinguishes between jurisdictional
regulation and waivers of immunity.3 The current focus is on an
immunity-waiver that confers jurisdiction to resolve tort claims against
the United States, but then withholds jurisdiction and extinguishes such
claims on unconstitutional grounds—a problem that implicates not only
individual rights but also the decisional independence of the Article III
courts.4
1 See Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government: Sovereignty, Immunity, and
Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 521, 549 (2003) (referring to the “vast”
debate about Congress’s power to control Article III jurisdiction).
2 See Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent: Congressional Regulation of Judicial
Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 191–92 (2001) (distinguishing the literature
about “jurisdiction-stripping” statutes from that concerning statutes regulating how federal
courts exercise jurisdiction). Additionally, commentators consider whether Congress
constitutionally may assign the adjudication of claims to non-Article III decision makers. See,
e.g., Paul Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts
Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990) (discussing the constitutionality of Article I
tribunals).
3 See Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and
Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1224–33 (1991)
(discussing the scope of the waiver-immunity as distinct from a statute regulating federal
jurisdiction); see also Sarah L. Brinton, Three Dimensional Sovereign Immunity, 54 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 239 (2014) (developing the position that Congress’s Waiver Power is neither
unilateral nor unreviewable and criticizing the notion of “exclusive congressional waiver”);
Jason Wojciechowski, Federalism Limits on Article III Jurisdiction, 88 NEB. L. REV. 288
(2009) (“structural limitations on the extent of congressional power [with respect to state
sovereign immunity] should be treated as limitations on the scope of the federal courts’
jurisdiction”).
4 Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 699 (1995) (discussing the term “decisional
independence”).
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The jumping off point for the discussion is the 2014 decision of the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Jackson v. United States,5 which arose
under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”).6 The FTCA waives the
government’s sovereign immunity and confers jurisdiction on Article III
courts to hear tort claims against the United States. The statute’s grant of
jurisdiction does not provide immediate access to federal court. Instead,
the potential plaintiff must first exhaust administrative remedies and
attempt to settle her claim with the agency whose employees are
implicated in the government’s alleged misconduct.7 If the agency denies
the claim, the tort victim may then file a federal action, and the suit must
be commenced within six months of the agency’s denial.8 In Jackson, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the agency’s mailing of a denial
letter was sufficient to trigger the filing period under the FTCA, despite
the fact that the claimant never received any notice of the government’s
decision because the letter, sent by certified mail to the claimant’s lawyer,
was returned to the agency as undeliverable and the agency took no
follow-up steps—even though the case file contained the claimant’s
current mailing address and regulations authorize the agency to give
notice of the denial directly to the claimant.9 Because the plaintiff filed
her federal complaint more than six months after the agency’s mailing of
the denial letter, the court considered the suit to be untimely; moreover,
the court treated the limitations period as a condition of the government’s

5
Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712 (6th Cir. 2014), rehearing denied, No. 13-1243,
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13779 (6th Cir. July 2, 2014).
6 Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (current version codified
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012) (jurisdiction conferred), § 2401(b)
(jurisdiction exclusions), §§ 2671–2680 (administrative exhaustion)); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)
(conferring “exclusive jurisdiction” on the federal district courts “for injury . . . caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within
the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred”); see Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort
Compensation Act of 1988, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (abrogating Westfall
v. Ervin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988)).
7 See generally George A. Bermann, Federal Tort Claims at the Agency Level: The FTCA
Administrative Process, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509 (1985) (describing the administrativeexhaustion process under the 1966 amendment to the FTCA).
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
9 See Jackson, 751 F.3d at 717 (stating that “the FTCA does not require that the claimant
receive the denial letter in order to commence the six-month limitation period”); 28 C.F.R.
14.9 (2014) (“Final denial of an administrative claim shall be in writing and sent to the
claimant, his attorney, or legal representative by certified or registered mail.”).
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waiver of immunity and so refused to permit equitable tolling. 10 Thus,
the court dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the
plaintiff was barred “forever” from securing judicial relief.11
The approach in Jackson is typical of many FTCA decisions: the
appeals court started from the premise that because the jurisdiction of the
district court depends upon the government’s waiving immunity to suit,
the procedural conditions attached to that waiver are jurisdictional and
require strict enforcement.12 This interpretation of the FTCA developed
before the Supreme Court attempted to clarify the distinction between
jurisdictional and claim-processing rules.13 It seems unlikely that the
statute’s procedures governing administrative exhaustion are
jurisdictional in the relevant sense given the location of the filing-period
procedure in the statute’s text and its functional significance to an
agency’s resolution of a claim.14 The correct approach would be to treat
the six-month filing period as an affirmative defense, and not as a
jurisdictional condition.15 Moreover, the court of appeals’ reliance on a
strict-construction rule to enforce the filing-period seems at odds with the
Supreme Court’s current view that strict construction extends only to the
10

Jackson, 751 F.3d at 717–18 (tolling not permitted because limitations period is
jurisdictional).
11 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (providing that a tort claim shall be “forever barred”).
12 See, e.g., Vacek v. U.S. Postal Serv., 447 F. 3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying rule of
strict construction to conditions of administrative exhaustion and dismissing suit as timebarred and jurisdictionally deficient); see Richard Parker, Is the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling
Applicable to the Limitations Periods in the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 135 MIL. L. REV. 1
(1992).
13 See Gonzalez v. Thaler, 132 S. Ct. 641, 648 (2012) (“This Court has endeavored in
recent years to ‘bring some discipline’ to the use of the term ‘jurisdictional.’ Recognizing our
‘less than meticulous’ use of the term in the past, we have pressed a stricter distinction
between truly jurisdictional rules, which govern ‘a court’s adjudicatory authority,’ and
nonjurisdictional ‘claim-processing rules,’ which do not.”) (citations omitted). The Court has
granted certiorari in a pair of FTCA cases concerning the availability of equitable tolling of
the time periods to file administrative claims and to file federal lawsuits. See June v. United
States, 550 F. App’x 505 (9th Cir. 2013) (administrative claims); Wong v. Beebe, 732 F.3d
1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (lawsuits). The author’s position is that the time periods are
classic claims-processing provisions and not jurisdictional, so equitable tolling ought to be
available. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2007). However,
even if the Court treats the provision as jurisdictional, the government’s waiver of immunity
would still be subject to constitutional constraints as argued in this article.
14 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (“United States as defendant . . . [t]he district courts
shall have original jurisdiction . . .”), with 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (“Time for commencing action
against United States”).
15 See, e.g., Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1991) (treating condition as
affirmative defense and not as jurisdictional requirement).
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“core” question of whether immunity is expressly waived.16 As Justice
Scalia explained in his 2012 book, entitled Reading Law, co-authored
with Brian A. Garner:
It is one thing to regard government liability as exceptional enough to require
clarity of creation as a matter of presumed legislative intent. It is quite something
else to presume that a legislature that has clearly made the determination that
government liability is in the interests of justice wants to accompany that
determination with nit-picking technicalities that would not accompany other
17
causes of action.

However, a conceptual error deeper even than the conflation of the
merits with jurisdiction, or the misuse of the rule of strict construction,
mars the analysis in Jackson: the court’s premise that the United States
may waive its immunity to suit on any terms that it wishes, even if those
terms violate the Constitution. In dismissing Jackson for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction because the filing was untimely under the so-called
“mailbox rule,” the court of appeals failed to consider an important
constitutional question: whether the equality and due-process provisions
of the Fifth Amendment bar the government from conditioning its
consent to suit upon a procedure that irrationally sorts claimants into
those to whom the agency provides timely and adequate notice before
they proceed to federal court, and those from whom the government
withholds such notice.18 Admittedly, only one Supreme Court decision
has come even close to acknowledging that there are limits to the
government’s authority to waive its sovereign immunity—the
notoriously puzzling opinion in United States v. Klein.19 However, since
Klein, the Court has held in Boumediene v. Bush that Congress’s
withdrawal of jurisdiction over habeas corpus relief must comport with
16

Gregory C. Sisk, The Inevitability of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 55 VILL. L. REV.
899, 923 (2010) (“Not unerringly or with consistent clarity, the Supreme Court appears to be
drifting toward an approach that reserves strict construction and presumptions in favor of the
government to core questions about whether sovereign immunity has been expressly waived
and the basic scope of that waiver.”); see also Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of
Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 439, 462 (2005) (noting “small cracks in the
edifice of strict construction”); Gregory C. Sisk, Twilight for the Strict Construction of
Waivers of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1245, 1320 (2014) (“The period of
strict construction of statutory waivers of federal sovereign immunity is closing.”).
17 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 285 (2012).
18 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
19 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871); Gordon G. Young, supra note
3, at 1197 (“Klein holds that there are limits upon Congress’ power to invoke the sovereign
immunity. Indeed, Klein is the only case in our constitutional history so to hold.”); see also
Lawrence G. Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed Solution, 86 GEO. L.J. 2525, 2525
(1998) (referring to “the puzzle of Klein”).
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the Constitution’s Suspension Clause.20 Moreover, in numerous
decisions, the Court has recognized that questions about the scope of
Congress’s power to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts are of
sufficient seriousness as to warrant efforts to interpret the challenged
statute to avoid constitutional problems.21
While accepting the
contentious principle that “[t]he King cannot be sued without his
consent,” this article argues that when an immunity-waiver operates as
the functional equivalent of a statute that regulates federal jurisdiction,
the waiver ought to be subject to the structural and substantive limits that
constrain a jurisdiction-regulating statute—limits that are narrow, but not
nonexistent.22 These constraints hold particular importance when, as in
Jackson, the immunity-waiver not only extinguishes individual property
interests, but also impairs the decisional independence of the federal
courts.
Part II of this article locates Jackson and its messy procedural story
within the FTCA’s statutory and regulatory framework. Part III is the
core of the article and explains why the approach of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Jackson is wrong—indeed, “dead wrong”—for it
assumes that Congress can use its waiver authority to regulate federal
jurisdiction in ways that circumvent constitutional limits.23 Certainly
Congress has broad power to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.24 But that power is not unfettered; although the limits are not welldefined, congressional power over federal jurisdiction is subject to
20
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (Suspension
Clause).
21 See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (applying the doctrine of constitutional
avoidance to a jurisdiction-regulating statute involving suit against the United States).
22 Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 1 (1963); see Kathryn E. Kovacs, Revealing Redundancy: The Tension Between
Federal Sovereign Immunity and Nonstatutory Review, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 77, 100 (2005) (“Of
course, Congress’s control over jurisdiction has its limitations.”); see also John M. Maguire,
State Liability for Tort, 30 HARV. L. REV. 20, 20 (1916) (“[T]he king can do no wrong . . . is
pointless where there is no king.”).
23 See, e.g., Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2317 n.3 (2013) (“[t]he
majority is dead wrong”) (Kagan, , J., dissenting); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131
S. Ct. 2780, 2803 (2011) (“To hold that Asahi controls this case would, to put it bluntly, be
dead wrong.”) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
310, 409 (2010) (“I am perfectly willing to concede that if one of our precedents were dead
wrong in its reasoning or irreconcilable with the rest of our doctrine, there would be a
compelling basis for revisiting it.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24 For an early and canonical case, see Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850)
(holding that statute withholding diversity jurisdiction from federal courts when diversity of
citizenship was created by assignment was not “in conflict with the Constitution”).
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constraints that are both internal and external to Article III of the
Constitution.25 These constraints protect not only separation of powers,
but also individual liberty.26 As Justice O’Connor explained in
Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, “Article III, § 1,
serves both to protect ‘the role of the independent judiciary within the
constitutional scheme of tripartite government,’ and to safeguard
litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided before judges who are free from
potential domination by other branches of government.’”27 This Part
explains why the government’s conduct in Jackson ran afoul of the
plaintiff’s right to equal protection and due process. In addition, the
immunity-waiver undermined judicial independence by conscripting the
Article III courts “to speak a constitutional untruth”—the essence of the
so-called Klein principle—by vesting jurisdiction in the court only to
dismiss the complaint and so to validate the extinguishing of the
plaintiff’s claims despite constitutional violations. 28 Rather than
dismissing the plaintiff’s claim in Jackson for a procedural or
jurisdictional defect, the court of appeals ought to have barred Congress
from conditioning jurisdiction upon a procedure that violates the Fifth
Amendment guarantee of equal treatment and due process.29
Finally, Part IV proposes a way to deal with the specific problem
that motivated the discussion, namely, the FTCA’s apparent use of a
mailbox-rule to start the clock running for the filing of a lawsuit in federal
court even when the claimant has received no notice and files suit late
due to no fault of her own. When faced with a reading of a statute that
25 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Jurisdiction-Stripping Reconsidered, 96 VA. L. REV.
1043, 1050 (2010) (referring to “understandings of Congress’s power to control jurisdiction
with non-originalist developments in substantive constitutional law”); see also Lawrence
Gene Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Power to Regulate the Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REV. 17, 22–26 (1981) (examining the source of
constitutional limits upon congressional power to regulate the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts and of the Supreme Court to adjudicate constitutional claims).
26 See Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the
Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2138 (2009) (discussing “uncontested
assertion that both individual rights and the separation of powers are impacted when Congress
constrains Article III review”).
27 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (quoting
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) and United States v.
Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).
28 Daniel J. Meltzer, Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2357,
2538, 2540 (1998) (defining the Klein principle).
29 Jackson v. United States, No. 12-10124, 2013 WL 361010 at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30,
2013).
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would raise serious constitutional questions, the Court typically resorts to
a canon of avoidance and seeks an interpretation that aligns the statutory
text with congressional purpose and constitutional requirements. 30
Consistent with this approach, the article suggests a reading of the FTCA
that is faithful to the statute’s text and consistent with equality and dueprocess guarantees. Surely in enacting the FTCA Congress did not
condition the government’s waiver of immunity upon “nit-picking”
technicalities of the sort that Justice Scalia has criticized.31 At the very
least, the argument presented ought to persuade the United States to
rethink its litigation position with respect to the FTCA limitations-period
to ensure that an agency does not insulate its employees’ alleged
wrongdoing by withholding timely and adequate notice, and in doing so,
preventing the injured party from securing judicial redress.
II. JACKSON V. UNITED STATES, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, AND
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
Jackson illustrates the thousands of tort claims annually filed against
the United States; together these FTCA suits expose the government to
liability that could amount to billions of dollars if the alleged injuries are
proved.32 The immunity of the United States is said to bar the federal
court’s disposition of these tort claims absent Congress’s clear statement
that the government has consented to suit.33 The FTCA waives the
government’s immunity and confers jurisdiction upon the federal courts
to hear such claims on the same terms as would apply to a private
individual under the governing state law. Decisions both reported and
unreported point to a broad range of plaintiffs: examples include a widow
30 See Schor, 478 U.S. at 841; Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345–48
(1936) (describing techniques to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions by the Supreme
Court).
31 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 17, at 285.
32 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION, FY 2015 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE
PLANS, SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (Mar. 2014) (stating that the
Civil Division annually “defeats billions of dollars in unmerited damages,” but that estimate
includes tort claims as well as contract and other financial claims).
33 See Ugo Colella & Adam Bain, The Burden of Proving Jurisdiction Under the Federal
Tort Claims Act: A Uniform Approach to Allocation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2859, 2866 (1999)
(“Consistent with ‘waiver-of-sovereign-immunity’ principles and general principles
governing federal subject matter jurisdiction,” the argument presented “begins with the
presumption that a federal court does not have jurisdiction over a tort suit brought against the
United States.”). For a discussion of the historical bases of the traditional view that immunity
bars such suit, see Jackson, supra note 1, at 522 (explaining that “sovereign immunity was a
doctrine of limited effect in the early years of this republic”).
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whose spouse was mauled to death by a grizzly bear in a national forest,
the widow of a veteran who died because of alleged medical malpractice
in a hospital operated by the Veterans’ Administration, and a prisoner
who alleged rape by a prison guard.34 Like Jackson, most of these
lawsuits—around eighty percent—are dismissed for jurisdictional
reasons or on the merits.35
A lawsuit filed under the FTCA may face a dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds for one of two reasons. First, the FTCA excludes
specific kinds of government actions from the grant of jurisdiction.36 In
addition, the Court has created another exception—the so-called Feres
doctrine—which excludes claims by members of the Armed Forces for
injuries suffered that are “incident to service.”37 As a matter of
jurisdiction, a court might dismiss a suit because it alleges a claim that
falls outside the government’s consent to suit; on this basis, courts
typically will dismiss a claim alleging rape of a prisoner as outside the
immunity-waiver because the suit involves an intentional tort and the
statute extends only to claims of negligence.38 The jurisdictional
34 See, e.g., Evert v. United States, 535 F. App’x. 703 (10th Cir. 2013); Warrum v. United
States, 427 F. 3d 1048 (7th Cir. 2005); Santillo v. United States, 2011 WL 2729243 (S.D. Cal.
2011).
35 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIVISION, supra note 32, at 22 (stating that the Justice
Department defeats at least 85 percent of defensive claims, which include federal-tort and
other suits); id. at 17 (setting forth the percentage of defensive cases resolved in government’s
favor).
36 See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (a)–(n) (2012) (providing that the jurisdictional grant under 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) “shall not apply” to the claims listed in § 2680, which include “a
discretionary function . . . whether or not the discretion involved be abused”; “the loss,
miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or postal matters”; “the assessment or
collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods” (subject to exceptions);
“certain suits in admiralty”; certain acts related to portions of Title 50 of the United States
Code related to war and defense; acts resulting from quarantine; acts resulting from “assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, libel, slander,
misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights” (however jurisdiction is
extended for “acts or omissions of investigative or law enforcement officers of the United
States Government” that result in claims arising “out of assault, battery, false imprisonment,
false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution”; “the fiscal operations of the Treasury
or by the regulation of the monetary system”; combatant activities “during time of war”; and
from activities in a foreign country, of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Panama Canal
Company, or a “Federal land bank, a Federal intermediate credit bank, or a bank for
cooperatives”).
37 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
38 See, e.g., Lineberry v. United States, No. 08-0597, 2009 WL 763052, *7–8 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 23, 2009) (dismissing prisoner’s claim that guards retaliated against him by arranging
for another prisoner to assault him as outside the government’s waiver as an intentional tort).
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exclusions thus preserve government immunity for misconduct that
otherwise would be actionable in a dispute involving two individuals—
for example, an assault and battery or sexual abuse.39
A second possible defect reflects the imprecision that has attached
to the term jurisdiction as distinct from questions going to the merits or
involving mere procedure.40 As in Jackson, many courts will dismiss a
case when the plaintiff fails to meet an administrative rule governing the
agency’s investigation and denial of a claim.41 For example, the FTCA
requires that a claim first be presented to the agency and that the written
statement set forth a “sum-certain” for damages.42 Many courts treat this
requirement as jurisdictional.43 Under this approach, a plaintiff who has
presented an agency with a claim for damages of “about” or “in excess”
of a stated dollar amount, rather than for a specific dollar amount, will be
treated as having failed to meet the procedural requirement of claimpresentment and the later-filed court action will be dismissed for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction—even though the agency already will have
investigated the claim, in no way lacked notice of the claim, and never
informed the claimant of this purported defect.44 It seems unlikely that
the procedures governing agency exhaustion are jurisdictional in the
relevant sense under the Court’s clarifying approach.45 The procedures
39 See, e.g., Doughty v. U.S. Postal Serv., 359 F. Supp. 2d 361, 367 (D.N.J. 2005)
(dismissing Postal Service employee’s claim of sexual assault by a co-worker because statute
excludes claims for assault and battery).
40 See Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction, Merits, and Substantiality, 42 TULSA L. REV.
579, 579 (2007) (criticizing the frequency with which federal courts conflate jurisdiction
“with the substantive merits of federal claims of right”).
41 Jackson v. United States, No. 12–10124, 2013 WL 361010 at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30,
2013).
42 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (2012) (“Action under this section shall not be instituted for any
sum in excess of the amount of the claim presented to the federal agency, except where the
increased amount is based upon newly discovered evidence not reasonably discoverable at
the time of presenting the claim to the federal agency, or upon allegation and proof of
intervening facts, relating to the amount of the claim.”); Kokotis v. U.S. Postal Serv., 223
F.3d 275, 277 (4th Cir. 2000) (failure to timely demand “sum certain” deprived a court of
jurisdiction); see also 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (2015).
43 See, e.g., Rispoli v. United States, 576 F. Supp. 1398 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 779 F.2d
35 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1069 (1986).
44 See, e.g., Gladden v. United States, 18 F. App’x 756 (10th Cir. 2001) (dismissing suit
alleging that Bureau of Prisons employee committed suicide due to alleged improper training
because damages sought were stated to be “in excess of $100,000.00” and so did not meet the
sum-certain requirement).
45 See, e.g., Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 131 S. Ct. 1197 (2011) (holding
that 120-day deadline for filing appeals to veterans court was not jurisdictional); Arbaugh v.
Y. & H. Corp. 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (holding that numerosity requirement under civil rights
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appear in sections of the statute separate from those that confer or exclude
jurisdiction, and the statute does not classify them as jurisdictional;
instead, the statute treats them as classic rules for processing a claim,
dealing with such matters as the content of a pleading. 46 Nevertheless, a
suit marred by a single and even trivial deviation from the rules governing
administrative review is at risk of being dismissed by the court as lacking
subject-matter jurisdiction, and the claimant is “forever” barred from
seeking legal recourse.47
Lawsuits falling into this second category—dismissed on what
might be considered to be faux jurisdictional grounds—often turn, as in
Jackson, on small and seemingly insignificant facts.48 Jackson arose from
a garden-variety car accident on January 13, 2009.49 According to the
Standard 95 Form submitted, the police reported that the plaintiff’s car
was properly stopped at the intersection of Abbott and Third Street in
Detroit, Michigan, when a car in the opposing lane crossed the centerline
at full speed and hit the plaintiff’s car head-on.50 The plaintiff suffered
“multiple injuries, including damage to her head and spinal cord.”51 What
made the case a federal one—and subject to administrative exhaustion—
was the status of the other driver: an Assistant Special Agent who worked
at the Detroit Field Office of the United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”).52 After the accident, the plaintiff hired a lawyer
named Michael Shaffer who was associated with a Detroit firm known
colloquially as “Michigan Autolaw.”53 The FTCA requires that a
statute was not jurisdictional). But see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (holding that
time period for filing notice of appeal was jurisdictional).
46 See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 515 (2006) (providing that when Congress does not clearly
state that a threshold limitation is jurisdictional, “courts should treat the restriction as
nonjurisdictional in character”). Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012) (conferring
jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2012) (exclusions from jurisdiction), with 28 U.S.C. §
2401(b) (2012) (time periods for suit) and 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (exhaustion required).
47 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
48 See Jackson v. United States, No. 12-10124, 2013 WL 361010 at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. Jan
30, 2013).
49 Id. at *1.
50 Id.; see also Exhibit 1, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 36–37, Jackson v. United
States, No. 12-10124, 2013 WL 361010 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013) (providing the court with
the Standard Form 95).
51 Jackson v. United States 751 F.3d 712, 714 (6th Cir. 2014).
52 Id.
53 Id.; see MICHIGAN AUTOLAW, http://www.michiganautolaw.com/ (last visited Feb. 18,
2015) (describing the law firm as “auto accident attorneys,” calling one partner an “auto law
guru,” and not listing federal tort suits as within its expertise).
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claimant submit her claim to the agency involved in the incident within
two years of the accrual of the claim, even if the state statute of limitations
is longer.54 On March 5, 2009, within the two-year period and consistent
with agency regulations, lawyer-Shaffer mailed ICE a written claim,
listing the amount of damages sought, together with a letter documenting
his authority to represent the plaintiff. 55 ICE received the claim “on or
about June 17, 2009,” and a paralegal working at ICE named Toyya
Azian mailed a letter addressed to “Claimant,” dated July 7, 2009, to
lawyer-Shaffer acknowledging the claim’s receipt.56 The FTCA requires
agencies to investigate and then either to settle or to deny a claim within
six months of receipt.57 Regulations further require the agency to send a
written denial of a claim to the claimant, her lawyer, or her
representative.58 The claimant has the option of filing a lawsuit if the
agency does not take action within the six-month period.59 On January
11, 2012, with the state limitations-period about to close and the claim
neither denied nor settled by the agency, the plaintiff—through a second
lawyer named Phillip Serafini, not associated with Michigan Autolaw—

54

See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012).
See Exhibit 1, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 35–37, Jackson, No. 12-10124, 2013
WL 361010 (providing the court with a letter from Michael R. Shaffer to the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security, dated March 5, 2009, and the Standard Form 95).
56 Jackson, 2013 WL 361010, at *1; Exhibit 2, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 38,
Jackson, No. 12-10124, 2013 WL 361010 (providing the court with a letter from Toyya Azian
of ICE to Claimant, dated July 7, 2009). ICE is the investigative arm of the Department of
Homeland Security. It is not immediately apparent from ICE’s website that for federal-tort
purposes, ICE is treated as a separate agency from Homeland Security. See U.S.
IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/about (last visited Feb. 18,
2015). Shaffer mailed the claim to the latter’s address. Jackson, 2013 WL 361010, at *1.
Technically the plaintiff’s claim was filed with the wrong agency—an error that is not unusual
among FTCA claimants and others who sue federal agencies. See John S. Gannon, Note,
Federal Tort Claims Act —Seeking Redress Against the Sovereign: Balancing the Rights of
Plaintiffs and the Government When Applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) to FTCA
Claims, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 223, 229–30 (2007) (discussing dismissal of FTCA suits for
naming the wrong government agency and amendments to the federal rules attempting to
obviate aspects of this problem). Federal regulations require transfer of the claim to the
agency involved in the incident, which Homeland Security did two months after it had
received the claim. See 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(b)(1) (2015).
57 See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2012).
58 See 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(a) (2015).
59 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); see also Ugo Colella, The Case for
Borrowing a Limitations Period for Deemed-Denial Suits Brought Pursuant to the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 391, 399–402 (1998) (discussing the legislative
history to the deemed-denial provision of the FTCA).
55
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filed two lawsuits: a federal suit under the FTCA against the United States
and a state suit under state law against the ICE agent involved in the
accident.60 As provided by statute, the United States Attorney General
removed the state action to federal court and substituted the United States
for the federal employee; eventually, the court consolidated the removed
action with the FTCA suit.61 With both suits now in federal court, the
government moved to dismiss the pair for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction on the ground that they were untimely because filed more
than six months after ICE had mailed its notice of denial of the claim. 62
Only through that motion did the plaintiff learn that ICE had denied her
claim; that it had sent a certified letter to that effect dated March 3, 2011,
postmarked later, to lawyer-Shaffer; that the letter had been returned to
ICE on March 23, 2011, stamped by the United States Postal Service as
“Not Deliverable as Addressed, Unable to Forward”; and that ICE had
taken no further steps to contact the plaintiff even though the case file
contained her address as well as her lawyer’s telephone number and email
address.63
What happened before ICE mailed the notice is disputed; the district
court did not hold a hearing or order discovery and instead relied on the
parties’ affidavits which set forth conflicting accounts. 64 On the
plaintiff’s side, the lawyer named Shaffer averred that he had called ICE’s
representative—the paralegal named Azian—about fifteen times trying
to settle the claim, but the representative had returned only one of his calls
and the matter had not resolved.65 He acknowledged that Michigan
Autolaw had moved in May 2010, but stated that its phone number and
email address, already in the ICE file, had remained the same; that at the
time of the office’s move, the firm had put in a forwarding order with the
United States Postal Service; and that when the order expired, the firm
used a “runner” to pick-up mail at the post office.66 The second lawyer,
named Serafini, also submitted an affidavit, averring that ICE’s
60

See Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 715 (6th Cir. 2014).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2) (2012); Jackson, 751 F.3d at 715; PAUL FIGLEY, A GUIDE
TO THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 55 (2012) (discussing procedure governing substitution of
the United States for the individual employee).
62 Jackson, 751 F.3d at 715.
63 Id. at 714–15
64
Id. at 715–16.
65 Id. at 715.
66 Id.
61
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representative had called him on February 2, 2011, to request that he file
a new demand letter and that he had notes of that phone call, which had
been logged in the usual course into the firm’s entry-system; that
statement seems to be supported by an exhibit to the government’s
motion showing that someone at ICE, presumably the representative with
whom the lawyer talked, had hand written Serafini’s name and phone
number at the bottom of the page of ICE’s copy of Shaffer’s earlier letter
accompanying the claim.67 On the defendant’s side, ICE averred that it
had received no written notice of the plaintiff’s change of counsel and
had no record of any phone call between its representative named Azian
and Serafini. Moreover, ICE stated that it no longer employed the
representative named Azian.68
The district court dismissed the suit as time-barred and lacking in
subject-matter jurisdiction, and it refused to subject the limitations period
to equitable tolling.69 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed the jurisdictional dismissal de novo and affirmed. The court
explained that a suit against the United States will be dismissed unless it
falls within the government’s waiver of immunity; here, the plaintiff
failed to meet the limitations period upon which the government’s
consent to suit was conditioned—that is, “a claimant may sue the United
States pursuant to the FTCA six months after presenting a claim to an
agency. . . . A claimant may no longer sue the United States six months
after the time that an agency mails a denial letter.”70 The appeals court
rejected the argument that an “‘undelivered notice of denial’ does not
trigger the six-month limitation window,” pointing to the text of the
statute which uses the word “mailing” of a denial, not receipt of a denial. 71
It further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in not
equitably tolling the claim, and it did not consider whether application of
the mailbox-rule to extinguish the plaintiff’s claim violated the
Constitution and so ought to have affected the jurisdictional analysis. 72
The court denied a request for en banc review.73
67 Id.; Exhibit 1 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 35, Jackson v. United States, No. 1210124, 2013 WL 361010 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013).
68 Jackson, 751 F.3d at 715.
69 Id. at 716.
70 Id. at 717 (internal citations omitted).
71
Id.
72 Id. at 719.
73 Id. at 712.
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III. WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY AND CONGRESS’S POWER TO REGULATE
FEDERAL JURISDICTION
The court of appeals in Jackson concentrated only on whether the
plaintiff met the procedures for administrative exhaustion, procedures
that the court characterized as jurisdictional because seen as conditions
of the government’s waiver of immunity to suit. The court of appeals did
not consider whether those conditions comported with constitutional
requirements. This Part argues that Congress ought not to be able to
waive its immunity to suit on terms that circumvent the Fifth Amendment
of the federal Constitution, as it did in Jackson when it withheld notice
from the plaintiff and then effectively blocked her from securing relief on
the merits. Congress may have unfettered control in deciding whether to
waive its immunity or not. However, once it submits to suit, the United
States cannot disregard the requirements of equal protection or due
process.
A. Sovereign Immunity and the Waiver Power
Although no principle is more entrenched in American law than that
of sovereign immunity, no principle is more contested and less grounded
in history or text.74 Because of sovereign immunity, the federal courts
traditionally assumed that they were without power to grant relief against
the United States for torts committed by its agents.75 After many years of
consideration—and weighed down by the private-bill system that doled
out compensation in place of administrative and judicial relief—
Congress enacted the FTCA, waiving its immunity to suit and conferring
jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear claims that are cognizable under

74

See Diane P. Wood, The Structure of Sovereignty, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 215, 219
(2014) (stating that the doctrine of sovereign immunity appears to be a structural
constitutional doctrine that is inferred from the overall Constitution itself, just like separation
of powers, rights of privacy, or incorporation of critical provisions of the Bill of Rights into
the Fourteenth Amendment). Compare Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907)
(“A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory,
but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority
that makes the law on which the right depends.”) (Holmes, J.), with Erwin Chemerinsky,
Shifting the Balance of Power? The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Sovereign
Immunity: Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2001) (stating that
“[t]he effect of sovereign immunity is to place the government above the law . . . ”).
75 See Alexander Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against the Federal
Government, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1942). But see Jackson, supra note 1, at 523–
52 (presenting a critical account of the assumption about traditional practice).
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the statute.76 In an early case interpreting the FTCA, the Supreme Court
rejected the government’s argument that its waiver of immunity “must be
strictly construed.”77 To the contrary, the Court emphasized that,
the congressional attitude in passing the Tort Claims Act is more accurately
reflected by Judge Cardozo’s statement . . . ‘The exemption of the sovereign from
suit involves hardship enough, where consent has been 78withheld. We are not to
add to its rigor . . . where consent has been announced.’

Nevertheless, for the last generation, courts have honored Justice
Cardozo’s statement in the breach. Decisions construing the FTCA
generally have invoked what is known as the “sovereign immunity
canon”—that a waiver will be “strictly construed in favor of the
sovereign” without attending to other indications of Congressional intent
or statutory text.79 Moreover, the canon has been extended to procedures
attached to the waiver, and not simply to whether immunity has been
waived.80 As in Jackson, the application of this canon almost inevitably
results in the dismissal of a suit that fails to meet the procedural
requirements of administrative exhaustion, however technical or trivial
the plaintiff’s deviation or omission.81 The Supreme Court appears to
have moved away from this approach.82 However, lower courts have not
consistently responded to the doctrinal shift.83

76

See generally Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States:
The Evolution from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625
(1985) (explaining the history of the move from private bills to legal claims).
77 United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366, 383 (1949).
78 Id. (quoting Anderson v. Hayes Constr. Co., 153 N.E. 28, 29–30 (1926)).
79 Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187 (1996). See generally Alex Kardon, Damages Under the
Privacy Act: Sovereign Immunity and a Call for Legislative Reform, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 705 (2011).
80 See Aaron Tang, Double Immunity, 65 STAN. L. REV. 279 (2013) (using the term
“double immunity” to refer to the requirement that a sovereign must expressly waive
immunity from suit and for monetary relief).
81 E.g., Tasha Hill, Inmates’ Need for Federally Funded Lawyers: How the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Casey, and Iqbal Combine with Implicit Bias to Eviscerate Inmate
Civil Rights, 62 UCLA L. REV. 176, 199–201 (2015) (“[m]inor technical errors filling out any
forms also bar meritorious claims”).
82 See, e.g., Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 234–224 (2007) (criticizing the doctrine of “total
exhaustion” under the Prison Litigation Reform Act).
83 Dolan v. United States Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 492 (2006) (internal quotation
omitted). See generally Sisk, Twilight for the Strict Construction of Waivers of Federal
Sovereign Immunity, supra note 16, at 1245 (arguing that the Court no longer strictly
construes waivers of sovereign immunity).
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B. Congressional Regulation of Jurisdiction
The court of appeals in Jackson closely examined whether the
plaintiff filed her lawsuit on time, but it failed to consider whether the
procedures used by the government to trigger the filing period
impermissibly circumvented constitutional requirements. Rather, the
court operated on the premise that Congress is free to condition its
consent to suit in federal court on any terms that it wishes, even when the
waiver is treated as the functional equivalent of a grant of jurisdiction.
This article challenges that assumption, and the ease with which the court
eliminated the possibility of judicial review. Traditionally, scholars have
assigned immunity-waivers and jurisdictional grants to separate and
different doctrinal categories, while commentary acknowledges that it is
not easy to draw the boundary between a waiver of immunity and a grant
of jurisdiction.84 What Henry M. Hart called “the bearing of sovereign
immunity” figured awkwardly into his canonical Dialogue on “the power
of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts.”85 Professor Hart
put to the side the question of “what constitutes such a suit” once the
government has given its consent.86 Section 1346(b) has been construed
to be both a waiver of immunity and a grant of jurisdiction.87 Not all
statutes involving suits against the United States share this hybrid quality.
A waiver of immunity does not always involve a conferral of jurisdiction
over claims to which the government has given its consent.88 Likewise, a
84
See Jackson, supra note 1, at 571 (“Sorting out the independent effect of ‘sovereign
immunity’ apart from the question of congressional control of the federal courts’ jurisdiction
is difficult.”).
85 Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1370 (1953); see also Stephen I. Vladeck,
Why Klein (Still) Matters: Congressional Deception and the War on Terrorism, 5 J. NAT’L
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 251, 253 (2011) (referring to the Dialogue and the difficulty of
subjecting congressional control of federal jurisdiction to any limit in the face of sovereign
immunity).
86 Hart, supra note 85.
87 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2012) provides in pertinent part: that the federal district courts
“shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for
money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”
88 See, e.g., Jaimes v. Lucas Metro. Hous. Auth., 833 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1987) (waiver
of immunity under the National Housing Act does not confer jurisdiction on the federal
courts).
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conferral of jurisdiction does not always lift the government’s immunity
from suit despite the court’s power to hear claims should the United
States give its consent.89 Sometimes, however, a waiver and a grant of
jurisdiction do go hand-in-hand; as the Supreme Court explained with
respect to the Tucker Act, involving subsection (a) of Section 1346:
It is axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its consent and that
the existence of consent is a prerequisite for jurisdiction. The terminology
employed in some of our prior decisions has unfortunately generated some
confusion as to whether the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign
immunity. The time has come to resolve this confusion. . . . [B]y giving the Court
of Claims jurisdiction over specified types of claims against the United States,
the Tucker Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to those
90
claims.

Suggesting that the FTCA’s waiver ought to be treated as the
functional equivalent of a grant of jurisdiction, and so subject to the same
scrutiny as a grant of jurisdiction, is not to say that a waiver and grant of
jurisdiction are equivalent in every way. Conceptually, there exists the
unanswered question whether sovereign immunity is properly treated as
jurisdictional.91 No provision of the Constitution explicitly withholds
jurisdiction from suits involving the United States, unlike the specific
exclusion of suits involving the states under the Eleventh Amendment. 92
89 Thus, for example, it is settled doctrine that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 does not confer
jurisdiction upon the federal courts to hear suits against the United States absent the
government’s waiver of its immunity. See Whittle v. United States, 7 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th
Cir. 1993) (“The federal question jurisdictional statute is not a general waiver of sovereign
immunity; it merely establishes a subject matter that is within the competence of federal courts
to entertain.”); Army & Air Force Exch. Serv. v. Sheehan, 456 U.S. 728 (1982) (28 U.S.C. §
1331 confers jurisdiction upon the district courts but does not the immunity of the United
States).
90 United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983); see 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) (2012)
(conferring original jurisdiction and waiving immunity).
91 See Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in the Federal
Courts, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 87–89 (2001) (discussing the extent to which sovereign
immunity poses a genuine restriction on the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction); see also
Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1559 (2002) (arguing that sovereign immunity is a doctrine of personal jurisdiction, not
subject-matter jurisdiction, and thus can be waived, forfeited, or subject to consent).
92 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”);
see also Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (“Although the text of the
Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal
courts, ‘we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it says,
but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.’”) (citing Blatchford v. Native Vill. of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)); Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53
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Moreover, although immunity blocks the court from exercising
jurisdiction unless the government consents to suit, jurisdictional rules
conventionally do not recognize consent or waiver as a basis of
competence.93 Descriptively, the immunity-waiver in Jackson enlarges
jurisdiction by conferring jurisdiction over claims to which Congress has
manifested the government’s consent. The jurisdiction-regulating
statutes that usually draw academic attention withhold power from the
federal court over discrete claims or remedies.94 The FTCA also sets forth
procedures, some of which limit the court’s jurisdiction and some of
which pertain to the claim. Statutes regulating jurisdiction also may
inpose conditions on the court’s power.95 Courts have sometimes
conflated these jurisdictional conditions with claims-processing rules that
ought not to be treated as jurisdictional. At the least, the interrelationship
between the FTCA’s waiver and its grant of jurisdiction raises questions
about the scope of Congress’s power—questions that the court of appeals
in Jackson entirely ignored.
C. Constitutional Limits on Congressional Authority to Waive
Immunity
Unlike most statutes that purport to regulate the jurisdiction of the
Article III courts, the immunity-waiver in Jackson does not on the surface
deprive the federal court of jurisdiction; to the contrary, it confers
jurisdiction, allowing the court to exercise power over law suits that are
timely filed by litigants after they have received notice that the agency
STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (2001) (“Nowhere does the . . . [Constitution] mention or even
imply that governments have complete immunity to suit.”).
93 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 710 (1999) (“sovereign immunity bars suits [against
a state] only in the absence of consent”); The Siren, 74 U.S. 152, 154 (1868) (“[The United
States] cannot be subjected to legal proceedings at law or in equity without their consent, and
whoever institutes such proceedings must bring his case within the authority of some act of
Congress.”); Dustin E. Buehler, Solving Jurisdiction’s Social Cost, 89 WASH. L. REV. 653,
654 (2014) (“[T[he parties cannot consent to or waive jurisdictional requirements.”).
94 See, e.g., Gerald Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction:
An Opinionated Guide to the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984). The Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, and 1711–15, provides
a counter-example to this generalization. See Adam N. Steinman, Sausage-Making, Pigs’
Ears, and Congressional Expansions of Federal Jurisdiction: Exxon Mobil v. Allapattah and
Its Lessons for the Class Action Fairness Act, 81 WASH. L. REV. 279 (2006).
95 See Lawson, supra note 2, at 191 (distinguishing between wholesale jurisdictionstripping and the regulation of how federal courts exercise their jurisdiction); see also Fallon,
Jr., supra note 25 (discussing jurisdiction-stripping provisions and the withdrawal of effective
remedies).
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has denied their claims. As interpreted by the court in Jackson, the
immunity-waiver also withholds power over lawsuits that are not timely
filed even if the agency did not actually notify the plaintiff that the claim
had been denied and the plaintiff had no other way to learn that the
limitations-period for filing suit was running. The question posed in this
Part is whether the Constitution forbids Congress from affecting a waiver
on these terms.
Certainly Article III would bar Congress from conferring
jurisdiction that goes beyond the enumerated categories of cases and
controversies set forth in Section 2.96 This is the basic teaching of
Marbury v. Madison: Congress cannot add to the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.97 Moreover, the Marbury-limit also seems to apply to the
notion of judicial power set forth in Section 1—for example, Congress’s
power to confer standing is constrained by some notion of justiciability
that is distinct from Section 2.98 Looking at the FTCA, surely Congress
could not waive its immunity on the condition that tort suits filed against
it be heard only as an original matter in the Supreme Court of the United
States, for the Constitution by its terms provides for no such jurisdiction. 99
Similarly, under current doctrine, Congress presumably could not waive
its immunity through the FTCA and confer jurisdiction on citizen-suits
by individuals who suspect agency misconduct but lack injury
proximately caused by a federal employee’s alleged negligence—the
waiver would not meet the injury-in-fact requirement that the Court
associates with Article III standing and the unaffected bystander would
face a dismissal of the action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.100
96 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (setting forth enumerated categories of cases or controversies
that are within the judicial power).
97 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–80 (1803).
98 See generally Heather Elliott, Congress’s Inability to Solve Standing Problems, 91
B.U. L. REV. 159 (2011).
99 The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to “Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party.”
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176–80; Akhil Reed Amar, Marbury, Section
13, and the Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 443, 452 (1989)
(“Yet Marbury emphatically forecloses such an argument, for the Court holds not only that
original jurisdiction need not be expanded when appellate jurisdiction is contracted, but
indeed that original jurisdiction may never be expanded.”). But see Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is
Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1208 (2001) (“[A] competing tradition
. . . dispenses federal judicial power based on how important the Court considers the federal
interest at stake, on the merits[.]”).
100 See Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390
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The waiver in Jackson presents a different kind of problem: it
specifies the manner in which jurisdiction is to be determined, allowing
power to be exercised over timely filed claims, and uses the agency’s
mailing of a denial letter as the starting point for the limitations-period
even when the agency and the court know that the claimant received no
notice. This Part argues that even if the government cannot be compelled
to waive its immunity to suit, it may not condition jurisdiction on
processes that are so arbitrary and irrational as to circumvent the equality
and due-process requirements of the Fifth Amendment.101 As the doctrine
of unconstitutional conditions makes clear, the Constitution constrains to
(2014) (stating that the usual rule is to construe a federal cause of action “to incorporate a
requirement of proximate causation”). Alternative theories of tort law and causation could
provide a basis that would meet Article III requirements. See, e.g., John Gardner, What is
Tort Law For? Part 1: The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL. 1, 11 (2011) (“[B]e
it corrective or be it distributive, an injustice perpetrated by anyone is in principle everyone’s
business, and anyone at all has reason to help in securing its avoidance[.]”). See also Cass
Sunstein, What’s Standing after Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH.
L. REV. 163, 214 (1992) (“Neither English nor American practice supports the view that
stranger suits are unconstitutionally impermissible.”).
101 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that the
federal government is bound to follow the same Equal Protection Clause as the states). There
is no consensus on whether constitutional provisions other than Article III—and, after
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), the Suspension Clause—limit Congress’s power
to regulate federal jurisdiction. See Fallon, Jr., supra note 25, at 1053 (“Because
Boumediene’s ruling rested wholly on the Suspension Clause, it has no necessary bearing on
jurisdiction-stripping proposals outside the scope of that provision.”). Nevertheless, a few
arguments recur in the literature and give credibility to the view that congressional authority
is subject to constitutional constraint under provisions that are external to Article III. Justice
Scalia, for example, has argued that Congress’s power to regulate federal jurisdiction is
subject to the structural provisions of Article II; the Constitution’s commitment to Presidential
authority thus constrains Congress from establishing citizen-suit procedures that delegate the
Executive’s “take care” power to a private party, and an enforcement action brought under
such suit lacks subject-matter jurisdiction unless the individual has suffered her own concrete
injury. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4 (“[The President] shall take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (“To permit
Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in executive officers’ compliance with
the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer
from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to
take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1023, 1049 (2009) (“Supreme Court doctrine on the scope of congressional power to
influence standing in federal court is not a model of clarity. No Justice has suggested that
Congress lacks any power in this regard, and even cases like Lujan suggest that Congress may
statutorily bless injuries to provide standing where those injuries would not have been
recognized at common law. But beyond those generalities, the level of congressional
authority to authorize departures from the private rights model is not clear.”) (citation
omitted).
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some extent even those government acts that the government is not
required to take, for example, “whenever government conditions a benefit
it is not obligated to provide on waiver of a constitutional right.”102
i. Equal Protection
Turning first to equal protection, no doubt it is unusual to argue that
a statute regulating federal jurisdiction raises equality concerns. Jackson
involves no claim of invidious motive and implicates no suspect class; an
equality challenge to its classification of claimants may seem like an uphill battle. The American doctrine of equality is notoriously thin,
permitting the government to draw statutory classifications that are
rational, with the core inquiry focused on whether the categories are
sufficiently consistent as “to treat like cases alike.”103 Indeed, the
government’s interest in administrative convenience can justify
classifications that might otherwise fail under higher forms of scrutiny. 104
Waiving immunity to permit tort suits only by Sabbath observers would
seem to be impermissible; waiving immunity in suits challenging
102 Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in
Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 8 (2001). The unconstitutional conditions doctrine is a
murky area of law. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1413, 1415 (1989) (referring to “confusion” in the application of the doctrine); cf. Adam
B. Cox & Adam M. Samaha, Unconstitutional Conditions Questions Everywhere: The
Implications of Exit and Sorting for Constitutional Law and Theory, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 61,
65 (2013) (“[A]n amusing aspect of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine is that there is no
doctrine. At least there is no snappy and established test for analyzing unconstitutional
conditions questions.”). See generally Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem
of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1984) (observing that
the unconstitutional-conditions cases can manifest an inconsistency so “marked to make a
legal realist of almost any reader”).
103 Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (“Our equal protection
jurisprudence has typically been concerned with governmental classifications that ‘affect
some groups of citizens differently than others.’”) (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425 (1961)); South v. South Carolina, 474 U.S. 888, 890 (1985) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“This Court's refusal to treat like cases alike can only add to the unconstitutionally
arbitrary nature of the death penalty.”). For a discussion of the substantive content, if any, of
American equality doctrine, see Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV.
1210, 1212 (1997) (arguing for prescriptive equal protection that is nontautological and has
substantive logical content); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537
(1982); see also Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 751
(2011) (making the “descriptive claim that the Court has shut doors in its equality
jurisprudence in the name of pluralism anxiety and opened doors in its liberty jurisprudence
to compensate”).
104 See, e.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (upholding gender classification
for administrative reasons).
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restrictions on Sabbath observance to permit only injunctive relief could
be permissible.105 But claims of equality are not limited to members of
suspect classes; although the circumstance is unusual, the Supreme Court
has held that “[t]he clause protects class-of-one plaintiffs victimized by
the ‘wholly arbitrary act.’”106 Moreover, despite the infrequent nature of
an equality challenge to an immunity-waiver, the argument carries a
distinguished pedigree. One significant reading of United States v.
Klein—the only case in constitutional history in which the Court both
invalidated Congress’s regulation of jurisdiction and also recognized that
an immunity-waiver is subject to some constitutional constraint—
associates the decision with a principle of non-discrimination that goes to
the core of equal protection.107 Under this principle, Congress may not
open the courthouse doors to one class of litigants and close it to those
who are similarly situated.108 As William W. Van Alystyne has explained,
“Even a privilege, benefit, opportunity, or public advantage may not be
granted to some but withheld from others where the basis of classification
and difference in treatment is arbitrary.”109

105 See Fallon, supra note 25, at 1067 (discussing the applicability of suspect-class
analysis to jurisdiction-stripping statutes); see also Lloyd C. Anderson, Congressional
Control over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: A New Threat to James Madison’s
Compromise, 39 BRANDEIS L.J. 417 (2000–2001) (discussing congressional control over
jurisdiction and remedies). For a discussion of the power of federal courts to remedy
jurisdiction statutes that exclude claims or litigants, see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts
on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional Legislation, 28 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 301
(1979) (discussing judicial power to extend under-inclusive statutes) and Mark V. Tushnet &
Jennifer Jaff, Why the Debate over Congress’ Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts Is Unending, 72 GEO. L.J. 11, 1322 (1984) (stating that Congress “has plenary
authority to structure remedies”).
106 Ind. Teachers Ass’n v. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 101 F.3d 1179, 1181–82 (7th Cir. 1996).
But see Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598 (2008) (exempting public
personnel decisions from class-of-one equality challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment).
107 Meltzer, supra note 28, at 2549 (“Klein should not be discarded as a badly-reasoned
relic with no contemporary significance. For the Court’s decision continues to stand for
something general and important—that whatever the breadth of Congress’s power to regulate
federal court jurisdiction, it may not exercise that power in a way that requires a federal court
to act unconstitutionally.”); Gordon G. Young, supra note 3, at 1230 (suggesting that Klein
took “an antidiscrimination position on sovereign immunity”).
108 Ind. Teachers Ass’n, 101 F.3d at 1181–82. But see Engquist, 553 U.S. at 598
(exempting public personnel decisions from class-of-one equality challenges under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
109 See William W. Van Alystyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1454 (1968).
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The facts of Klein are well known and need not be rehearsed in
detail.110 Klein involved efforts under the Abandoned and Captured
Property Act of 1863 to recover proceeds from the sale of property that
had been seized by Union soldiers during the Civil War.111 Only those
who were loyal to the Union could recover property, and the question was
how to distinguish rebels from those who merely resided or did business
within the states of the Confederacy. 112 The Court had held in United
States v. Padelford that a presidential pardon was proof of loyalty to the
Union.113 In response, Congress, by the Act of July 12, 1870, conferred
original jurisdiction on the claims court and appellate jurisdiction on the
Supreme Court, authorizing the judiciary to dismiss any claim or to
reverse any judgment when proof of loyalty was based upon a
presidential pardon.114 The Court in Klein held that the statute was
unconstitutional.115
The precise grounds of the Klein decision have been called
everything from “enigmatic” to “deeply puzzling.”116 In one of the
narrower readings of the decision, commentary focuses on the statute’s
disregard of equal protection: Congress erected an arbitrary distinction
between persons who sought to recover property—as Gordon G. Young
explains it—“open[ing] the courts to truly innocent plaintiffs while
closing them to those whose innocence comes by way of a pardon.” 117
Applying this reading to Jackson, we might argue that having consented
to suit in federal court, the government is not free to open the courts to
injured persons to whom the government chooses to give notice and to

See Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s Authority to Shape
the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 87 (Vicki C. Jackson &
Judith Resnik eds., 2010).
111 The Abandoned and Captured Property Collection Act, ch. 120, § 3, 12 Stat. 820
(1863).
112 See Gordon G. Young, supra note 3, at 1198 (stating that under the Act, those who
had never given aid or comfort to the rebellion could recover).
113 United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1869).
114 Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 18 Stat. 230 (1870).
115 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148, (1871).
116 See Vladeck, Why Klein (Still) Matters, supra note 85, at 251 (calling Klein
“enigmatic” and “intriguing”); Howard M. Wassserman, The Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79
U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 53–55 (2010) (reporting that Klein has been called “deeply puzzling,”
“disjointed,” “delphic,” and “generally difficult to follow”).
117 Gordon G. Young, supra note 3, at 1230.
110

HELEN HERSHKOFF.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

WAIVERS OF IMMUNITY

11/3/2015 3:47 PM

267

close the courts to those to whom it does not so choose.
The FTCA requires the agency to send notice to all claimants that a
claim has been denied; that notice announces to the claimant that the time
for filing a federal lawsuit to challenge the denial has started to run. To
achieve the statutory goal, the agency must send the denial-letter by
certified or registered mail, which provides evidence of receipt, and
regulations state that the notice may go to the claimant, her attorney, or
her representative.118 In Jackson, the agency sent the denial by certified
mail to the claimant’s lawyer, and when that letter was returned as
undeliverable, took no steps to notify the claimant of the denial despite
the fact that her name and contact information were in the file. 119 By
effect, the government irrationally constructed two categories of
claimants: those claimants who received notice of their denial, and those
claimants who are known by the agency not to have received notice, even
though their contact information is in the file, and on this basis are
blocked from filing their federal lawsuits on time. Although the litigants
are similarly situated, those in the second group are cut-off at the starting
gate from obtaining judicial relief on the merits of their claims.120
Described in this way, the classification results from the agency’s
own conduct—its failure to provide a required notice—and carries a
family resemblance to the classification invalidated in Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush.121 Logan involved the question of whether the
Fourteenth Amendment barred a state agency from dismissing an
administrative claim as out-of-time and so without jurisdiction when the
agency had failed to schedule an essential conference within the
118 See 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (2012) (referring to the agency’s mailing, by certified or
registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented);
28 C.F.R. § 14.9 (2015) (mailing of notice to the claimant, counsel, or representative).
119 The government argued that it would be an ethical violation to contact a claimant who
was known to have representation. Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 718 n.3 (2014)
(citing Def. Br. at 22 n.1). But see Ann McGuire, The Quality of Mercy is Not Strained:
Interpreting the Notice Requirement of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1034,
1048 (1999) (rejecting this argument on the ground that ethical rules permit for direct contact
with represented parties when permitted by law).
120 Even assuming the problem in Jackson is anomalous, and it is not, the Supreme Court
has recognized the possibility—admittedly controversial—of a “class-of-one” theory for
equal protection analysis. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). But see
William D. Araiza, Flunking the Class-of-One/Failing Equal Protection, 55 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 435, 438 (2013) (stating that the Court [in Olech] appeared to think the matter was
uncontroversial).
121 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 438–39 (1982).
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allowable time.122 Claims filed within the statutory period were given
“full consideration on the merits,” but the plaintiff’s claim—filed late
because of the agency’s error—was “unceremoniously, and finally,
terminated.”123 The state appeals court rejected the federal equalprotection and due-process challenges, and refused to permit a second
filing, on the view that deviating from the legislative procedures would
“frustrate the public interest in an expeditious resolution of disputes;” the
Supreme Court reversed, finding a violation of due process and not
reaching the equality claim.124 Justice Powell, concurring in the
judgment, and joined by Justice Rehnquist, addressed the equalprotection claim, and held that even under the weakest form of scrutiny,
the state impermissibly had created two classifications of claimants: those
with claims that were timely scheduled by the agency, and those that were
not, with the former being accorded full consideration on the merits and
the latter summarily dismissed.125 “Under this classification,” the
concurrence explained, “claimants with identical claims, despite equal
diligence in presenting them, would be treated differently.” 126 The
concurring opinion found that the classification did not promote the
state’s interest “in the timely disposition of claims,” and that it would be
“unfair and irrational” to punish the claimant; Justice Powell urged the
common sense solution of administrative tolling for this “isolated
example of bureaucratic oversight.”127 A plurality opinion by Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O’Connor, also
found an equal-protection problem, and while acknowledging that the
challenged classification was “an unconventional one,” characterized it
as “the very essence of arbitrary state action:” “the State converts
similarly situated claims into dissimilarly situated ones, and then uses this
distinction as the basis for its classification.”128

122 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Logan, 455 U.S. at 424 (“The issue in this case is
whether a State may terminate a complainant's cause of action because a state official, for
reasons beyond the complainant's control, failed to comply with a statutorily mandated
procedure.”).
123 Logan, 455 U.S. at 438–39.
124 Id. at 428.
125 Id. at 443.
126
Id.
127 Id. at 443–44.
128 Id. at 438–42.
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So in Jackson, the agency withheld notice from the plaintiff,
knowing how to contact her and fully aware that notice to her lawyer had
been returned by the mail service as undeliverable. It then used that
disparate treatment as the basis for the federal court’s dismissal of the
plaintiff’s belated claim, even though the plaintiff had no way of knowing
that the agency had denied her claim and that the filing period had begun
to run. Admittedly, the statute has an escape-hatch permitting claimants
to file suit when the agency has unjustifiably delayed in resolving the
claim; but that procedure does not excuse the government’s failure to
provide notice at the required time.129 It would run counter to the goals of
administrative exhaustion to require litigants to file suit before they know
whether they are even dissatisfied with the agency’s resolution; invoking
judicial resources involves both private and public costs. Moreover, as
demonstrated by Jackson’s situation, the claimant cannot accurately
predict whether her filing meets the statutory deadline. To the extent that
administrative exhaustion is intended to encourage expeditious resolution
of claims without judicial involvement, the classification at play in
Jackson cannot be said to promote a plausible government interest.
Congress could not directly sort claimants by withholding notice from
some, but not from others; similarly it may not indirectly rely on so
arbitrary a process by attaching it as a condition to an immunity-waiver.
ii. Due Process
The lack of notice in Jackson raises the additional question of
whether the government’s conduct satisfied due process.130 As the
Supreme Court explained over a hundred years ago, due process “is a
restraint on the legislative as well as the executive and judicial powers of
the government, and cannot be construed to leave congress free to make
‘any due process of law,’ by its mere will.”131 Congress cannot consent
to jurisdiction on condition that a party must forfeit her rights to
procedural protection or that the court ignore the requirements of the Due
Process Clause. That due process applies to the challenged action under
the Fifth Amendment cannot seriously be disputed. Due process protects
property, although it does not create property, and the Court has

129

See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2012).
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 210 (6th ed. 2012) (“[C]ongress
cannot restrict jurisdiction in a manner that would deny due process of law”).
131 Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1856).
130
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recognized that a cause of action is a “species of property protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause,” with the same rule
applicable to the Fifth Amendment.132 Justice Blackmun explained in
Logan:
This conclusion is hardly a novel one. The Court traditionally has held that the
Due Process Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts, either
as defendants hoping to protect their property or as plaintiffs attempting to redress
grievances. In Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 2
L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958), for example—where a plaintiff’s claim had been dismissed
for failure to comply with a trial court’s order—the Court read the ‘property’
component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to impose
‘constitutional limitations upon the power of courts, even in aid of their own valid
processes, to dismiss an action without
affording a party the opportunity for a
133
hearing on the merits of his cause.’

As in Logan, the plaintiff’s right to access federal relief was “more than
an abstract desire or interest in redressing . . . [a] grievance,” but rather,
was established by the federal statute.134 The fact that the claim in Jackson
was asserted under the FTCA does not change the property analysis;
although there is a species of public right that Congress may alter at will,
the FTCA does not create causes of action; rather it extends jurisdiction
over causes of action that exist at common law and would expose the
United States to liability, but for the cloak of sovereign immunity. 135
The question then is what process is due. In Jackson, the
government triggered a jurisdictional time-period by sending a notice of
denial by certified mail to the claimant’s counsel with no follow-up when
the letter was returned as undeliverable even though the case file
contained the claimant’s address (as well as the lawyer’s phone number
and email).136 Due process does not require perfect procedures; the
132 See Logan, 455 U.S. at 428; Timothy P. Terrell, Causes of Action as Property: Logan
v. Zimmerman Brush Co. and the “Government-as-Monopolist” Theory of the Due Process
Clause, 31 EMORY L.J. 491, 508 (1982) (arguing a tort cause of action is property for
constitutional purposes even in “the absence of transferability”); see also Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (“Equal protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as
that under the Fourteenth Amendment[.]”).
133 Logan, 455 U.S. at 429.
134 Id. at 431.
135 See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012); Richard E. Levy & Sidney A. Shapiro, Government
Benefits and the Rule of Law: Toward a Standards-based Theory of Judicial Review, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 499, 507 (2006) (“[S]ince the federal government may not be sued without
its consent, a litigant is entitled to sue in federal court claiming rights created by an act of
Congress only if that or another law consents to such suit”) (quoting RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 75 (3d ed.
1999)).
136 At a minimum, Logan would suggest that it is impermissible to trigger a limitations
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standard is flexible and context-specific.137 However, the Court has
repeatedly emphasized the importance of the government’s providing
adequate and timely notice before depriving an individual of her property,
and if the individual’s whereabouts are known, such notice must be actual
and not constructive.138 Above all, as explained in Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., the method of providing notice must be “such
as one desirous of actually informing . . . might reasonably adopt to
accomplish it.”139
In its 2006 decision in Jones v. Flowers, the Court addressed an
analogous situation in which a state agency sent a notice by certified mail
to a delinquent taxpayer advising of an upcoming tax sale, the agency
took no follow-up steps when the letter was returned as undeliverable, the
property was sold at a sheriff’s auction, and the taxpayer sued to recover
his property.140 The Court held that the state had violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, even though the state did not know
the taxpayer’s current address because the taxpayer had failed to update
his file. Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the government’s failure
to try to contact the taxpayer a second time violated even the flexible
standard announced by Mullane:
We do not think that a person who actually desired to inform a real property
owner of an impending tax sale of a house he owns would do nothing when a
certified letter sent to the owner is returned unclaimed. If the Commissioner
prepared a stack of letters to mail to delinquent taxpayers, handed them to the

period based on an act that the government did not take—in Jackson, actually notifying the
claimant that the claim had been denied. Logan, 455 U.S. at 434–35 (“A system or procedure
that deprives persons of their claims in a random manner . . . necessarily presents an
unjustifiably high risk that meritorious claims will be terminated. And the State’s interest in
refusing Logan’s procedural request is, on this record, insubstantial.”). Numerous courts of
appeal have held that an administrative forfeiture proceeding is void when the party with an
interest in the forfeited property “failed to receive constitutionally adequate notice.” See, e.g.,
Kandonsky v. United States, 216 F.3d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 2000). In some circuits, the
claimant’s remedy for inadequate notice is restoration of the right “to seek a hearing in the
district court.” Boero v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 111 F.3d 301, 304–07 (2d Cir. 1997);
see also United States v. Dusenbery, 201 F.3d 763, 768 (6th Cir. 2000), aff'd on other grounds,
534 U.S. 161 (2002) (stating that “inadequate notices should be treated as voidable, not void,
and that the proper remedy is simply to restore the right . . . to judicially contest the forfeiture).
137 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 429 U.S. 319 (1976) (setting forth a balancing test that is
context specific).
138 See Tulsa Prof’l Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484 (1988) (“[S]tate
action affecting property must generally be accompanied by notification of that action[.]”)
139
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950) (interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment).
140 Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 229 (2006).
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postman, and then watched as the departing postman accidentally dropped the
letters down a storm drain, one would certainly expect the Commissioner’s office
to prepare a new stack of letters and send them again. No one “desirous of
actually informing” the owners would simply shrug his shoulders as the letters
disappeared and say “I tried.” Failure to follow up would be unreasonable,
despite the fact that the letters were reasonably
calculated to reach their intended
141
recipients when delivered to the postman.

Likewise, in Jackson, when the agency saw that its certified letter to the
claimant’s counsel was returned as undeliverable, its employees could
not constitutionally “simply shrug” their shoulders and take no further
action, when follow-up contact information was easily available from the
case file.142 Chief Justice Roberts specifically rejected the view, set forth
in Justice Thomas’ dissent, that due process takes account only
information that the government has “before it calculated how best to
provide notice,” and not after; although “the failure of notice in a specific
case does not establish the inadequacy of the attempted notice,”
knowledge that notice provided in the usual course turned out to be
ineffective “was one of the ‘practicalities and peculiarities of the case’”
that could trigger “an obligation on the government’s part to take
additional steps to effect notice.”143
In Jackson, the “practicalities” of the case highlight the arbitrary
quality of the agency’s failure. The FTCA requires the agency to provide
notice by certified or registered mail; that method of notice ensures that
the agency receives confirmation that the claimant or her proxy actually
has received the notice that was mailed. The requirement of certified or
registered mail is not simply a technical formality that leaves the agency
free to do nothing when a letter is returned.144 Moreover, in Jackson, the
agency did not even need to search a phone book to locate the claimant—
her address was in the case file, yet the court of appeals assumed that
having the agency take any additional steps would be an undue
administrative burden.145 In addition, regulations specify that the agency
141

Id.
Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 717 (6th Cir. 2014).
143 Jones, 547 U.S. at 230–31 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314–15).
144 See Bermann, supra note 7, at 579 (“One reason the potential for misunderstanding
and confusion concerning the final denial has not materialized is that the FTCA requires
agencies to issue final denials in the form of certified or registered mail. Justice Department
regulations additionally require an express warning to dissatisfied claimants that they must
bring suit, if at all, within six months of the date of mailing. Until claimants receive such a
communication, they can safely assume that their claim has not been finally denied and that
the statute of limitations has not yet begun to run.”) (citations omitted).
145 Jackson, 751 F.3d at 718.
142
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may give notice to the claimant or her counsel or representative.
Presumably if notice cannot be given to counsel, notice can be attempted
directly to the claimant, an argument that the court of appeals considered
but rejected without raising or addressing any due-process concerns.146
Instead, the court of appeals sidestepped the constitutional question,
and—insisting that the immunity-waiver must be strictly enforced—
suggested that the absence of notice resulted from the failure of the
plaintiff and her lawyer to notify the agency of the lawyer’s change in
address and of the substitution of counsel.147 Even if this account fairly
reflected the record—and it does not—the legal argument has no
constitutional significance.148 In Jones, Chief Justice Roberts rejected the
argument that a claimant who fails to up-date his address “forfeits his
right to constitutionally sufficient notice.”149 To the contrary, the majority
emphasized that the claimant’s action does not excuse the government’s
constitutional failure or “alter the unreasonableness of the . . . position
that . . . [the agency] must do nothing more when the notice is promptly
returned ‘unclaimed.’”150
Finally, it might be argued that the source of the agency’s obligation
in Jones v. Flowers to take follow-up steps was derived from the
Arkansas statute, governing the sale or forfeiture of real property to be
sold for taxes, and not the requirements of due process. 151 That statute
specifically provides:
If the notice by certified mail is returned undelivered for any other reason, the
Commissioner of State Lands shall send a second notice to the owner or interested
party at any additional address reasonably identifiable through the examination
of the real property records properly filed and recorded in the office of the county

146

See id. at 718; 28 C.F.R. § 14.9 (2015).
Jackson, 753 F.3d at 717–18.
148 The claimant’s representative, a lawyer associated with a well-regarded law firm, took
the reasonable step of informing the United States Postal Services of a change of address, and
when the forwarding order expired, used “runners” to pick up mail from the post office.
Runners apparently were necessitated by systemic problems in the mail-delivery service in
Detroit. See Chris Christoff, Abandoned Dogs Roam Detroit, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 21,
2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-21/abandoned-dogs-roam-detroit-inpacks-as-humans-dwindle.html (reporting mail delivery halted in some Detroit
neighborhoods); Lisa M. Collins, Delivery in Doubt, METRO TIMES (Feb. 12, 2003),
http://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/delivery-in-doubt/Content?oid=2175537
(reporting
systemic problems of mail delivery).
149
Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220, 232 (2006).
150 Id. at 232.
151 Id.
147
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By contrast, the FTCA does not prescribe a second-notice requirement,
so arguably an FTCA claimant’s procedural rights are limited to those set
forth in the statute. This view informed the court of appeals’ conclusion
that an FTCA claimant has a right only to the procedures attached to the
government’s immunity-waiver.153 The court ignored the federal
agency’s regulation that contemplated the possibility of notice to the
claimant or to the lawyer, and likewise did not consider the functional
significance of requiring the agency to use certified or registered mail as
the method of notification. More importantly, the appeals court assumed,
incorrectly, that Congress may create a substantive interest but subject it
to fewer procedural protections than the Fifth Amendment requires. 154 As
the Supreme Court explained in Logan,
While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest . . . it may not
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred,
without appropriate procedural safeguard . . . . [T]he adequacy of statutory
procedures for deprivation of a155statutorily created property interest must be
analyzed in constitutional terms.

When a substantive right—such as a cause of action or federal
jurisdiction—is “inextricably intertwined” with a statute’s procedural
protections, a litigant cannot be compelled “to take the bitter with the
sweet.”156 Congress may be free to withhold jurisdiction over tort claims
against the United States, but once it waives immunity, it cannot
condition access to a court on procedures that violate due process, for the
validity of the procedure is determined by the Constitution, not by
legislative grace. Justice White has explained:
[I]t is settled that the ‘bitter with the sweet’ approach misconceives the
constitutional guarantee. If a clearer holding is needed, we provide it today. The
point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive
rights—life, liberty, and property—cannot be deprived except pursuant to
constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of substance and procedure
are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere
tautology. “Property” cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its
152

ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-37-301(a)(4) (2011).
Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 717–18 (6th Cir. 2014) (sending a notice
would have been the “preferred” course, but was not the “required” course, and the
government’s waiver must be read strictly in favor of the United States).
154 Id.
155 Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432 (1982) (alteration in original;
quotation marks omitted) (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 490–491 (1980)) (quoting
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974) (opinion concurring in part)).
156 Arnett, 416 U.S. at 152–154 (explaining the “bitter with the sweet” argument, set out
in the plurality that was specifically rejected by the other six Justices).
153
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deprivation any more than can life or liberty. The right to due process “is
conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the
legislature may elect not to confer a property interest . . . it may not
constitutionally authorize the deprivation of
such an interest, once conferred,
157
without appropriate procedural safeguards.”

The Due Process Clause does not protect against every deprivation
of property. In particular, certain unintended losses that are caused by
negligent acts by government employees fall outside its scope.158 But the
plaintiff in Jackson was not subject to a random act, akin to “leaving a
pillow on the prison stairs, or mislaying an inmate’s property”; to the
contrary, the agency made the deliberate decision not to take follow-up
steps even though it knew that its earlier notice had been returned.159 In
just this circumstance, the Due Process Clause is intended to provide
“procedural safeguards” that protect an individual not only against the
loss of property, but also from what Dean Edward L. Rubin has called
“bureaucratic oppression”—“action by administrative agents that impose
unnecessary and harmful burdens on private parties.”160 That these
actions are associated with a waiver of sovereign immunity ought not to
shield them from judicial review.
iii. Judicial Independence
So far the discussion has examined the constitutionality of the
government’s practice from the perspective of the individual litigant. But
the problem in Jackson goes beyond infringing the rights of the individual
litigant. The government did not simply use an unfair or arbitrary process
to extinguish the claimant’s cause of action; rather, the government used
such a process to foreclose relief, and then conscripted the federal court
to ratify the validity of that result. In effect, the court in Jackson could
take jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s suit only to dismiss her claim, thereby
allowing the government to extinguish a property interest despite the
absence of notice and in circumvention of constitutional limits. Even
more, by invoking the immunity-waiver as the grounds for the decision,

157 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1984) (citing Arnett, 416
U.S. at 167) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
158 The Supreme Court, 1985 Term—Leading Cases: Negligent Deprivation, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 144, 150 (1986) (“The due process clause is meant to address deliberate state
decisions.”).
159
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332 (1986).
160 Edward L. Rubin, Bureaucratic Oppression: Its Causes and Cures, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 291, 299 (2012).
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Congress was able to make it seem as if its treatment of the plaintiff was
permissible, even though it was impermissible under the Fifth
Amendment. To borrow from Lawrence G. Sager, the government’s
action violated the first principle of Klein: the United States “direct[ed]
the court to be instrumental to [an impermissible] end,” using its
immunity-waiver to validate claimant’s loss of property rights despite the
absence of fair and equal process.161
Professor Martin H. Redish and Christopher R. Pudelski have
argued that the Klein principle is violated whenever Congress enlists the
court in what the authors call legislative “micro deception.”162 Micro
deception occurs when Congress “leaves the generalized substantive law
intact, but legislatively directs that a particular litigation (or a group of
litigations) arising under that law be resolved in a manner inconsistent
with the dictates of that pre-existing generalized law.”163 Other
commentators link the Klein principle with the related requirement of
decisional independence, postulating that Congress cannot use the
vesting of jurisdiction or an immunity-waiver to compel the Article III
courts to “speak a constitutional untruth.”164 In other words, an Article III
problem is presented whenever Congress uses its waiver of sovereign
immunity to obscure a “micro deception” that makes it seem that the
government is committed to a legal rule when in fact it is relying on the
court’s exercise of federal jurisdiction to camouflage that it is not. As
Howard M. Wasserman discusses, drawing from the Redish and Pudelski
approach, “Congress cannot cook procedural and evidentiary rules to
achieve desired substantive outcomes without fully changing and
161 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 148 (1871); see Samuel Estreicher &
Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of Federal
Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 128 (2000); Sager, Klein’s First Principle:
A Proposed Solution, supra note 19, at 2531 (Klein’s first principle is that “the judiciary will
resist efforts to make it seem to support and regularize that with which it in fact disagrees.”).
162 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871).
163 Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of
Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v.
Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 439 (2006).
164 Meltzer, supra note 28, at 2540; see Sager, Klein’s First Principle: A Proposed
Solution, supra note 19, at 2529 (“This is how we should understand the first principle of
United States v. Klein: The judiciary will not allow itself to be made to speak and act against
its own best judgment on matters within its competence which have great consequence for
our political community. The judiciary will not permit its articulate authority to be subverted
to serve ends antagonistic to its actual judgment; the judiciary will resist efforts to make it
seem to support and regularize that with which it in fact disagrees.”).
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publicly acknowledging the state of substantive law.”165
The situation in Jackson presents a variant on that theme. The
FTCA creates a legal rule that commits the United States to the principle
of government accountability and to the goal of providing fair
compensation for individuals who are injured by the negligent actions of
federal agencies and officers. However, the no-notice procedure used in
Jackson suggests that the government’s commitment is a sham – a “micro
deception.”166 The United States has made it seem as if the FTCA lifts its
immunity, when in fact the government remains cloaked in immunity
because the agency blocks the claimant’s filing of a lawsuit by
withholding timely notice of the agency’s denial of its claim. As in Klein,
the United States in Jackson conscripted the federal court in this
deception; the court believed it was compelled to dismiss even legitimate
claims for reasons unrelated to the merits. It is just this sort of “micro
deception”—requiring individual cases to be resolved “in a manner that
is inconsistent with controlling law”—that forms the core of the Article
III problem.167
Saying that a waiver of immunity must respect judicial
independence to decide a case does not require a broad understanding of
Article III or of the federal court’s role as expositor of constitutional
meaning; nor does the argument assume that a federal court must actively
search a pending case for constitutional problems, even in the absence of
jurisdiction.168 Rather, the argument builds on the basic obligation of a
court to determine whether it has jurisdiction.169 The appeals court in
Jackson clearly recognized this obligation when it undertook de novo
review of the district court’s decision regarding jurisdiction, and so
examined plaintiff’s compliance with the requirement of timely filing,
which the court treated as a jurisdictional component of the immunitywaiver.170 However, the court failed to consider whether the conditions
165

Wasserman, The Irrepressible Myth of Klein, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 90 (2010).
Id.
167 Redish & Pudelski, supra note 163, at 439.
168 Cf. Fallon, supra note 25, at 1062 (offering but questioning a reading of Boumediene
v. Bush in which the Court treats “the judicial branch’s function of saying what the law is as
a ground for holding that the Constitution mandates federal jurisdiction”).
169 Capron v. Van Noorden, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 126, 127 (1804) (“Here it was the duty of
the Court to see that they had jurisdiction, for the consent of parties could not give it.”).
170 See Jonathan Remy Nash, On the Efficient Deployment of Rules and Standards to
Define Federal Jurisdiction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 509, 530 (2012) (stating that “district court
decisions regarding subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo”).
166
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attached to that waiver were themselves constitutionally suspect, a
question clearly within the appellate court’s reviewing power. 171
Although the boundaries of the doctrine are not clear, courts have some
residuum of jurisdiction to determine whether they have jurisdiction. 172
Thus, even if the plaintiff in Jackson had not raised a jurisdictional
objection in the proceedings below, the appeals court had the power and
a duty to raise the issue sua sponte; an entailment of the jurisdictional
inquiry concerns whether Congress may bar federal jurisdiction through
a procedure that infringes on constitutional guarantees.173

171 See Michael T. Morley, Avoiding Adversarial Adjudication, 41 FL. STATE U.L. REV.
291, 299 (2014) (“Courts generally are not required to consider waived or forfeited arguments,
unless they concern the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction or the justiciability of the case.”)
(citations omitted). Moreover, plaintiff argued below that an undelivered letter did not trigger
the jurisdictional time-period, and so the issue, even if it were not jurisdictional, was not
forfeited. See Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 717–18 (6th Cir. 2014).
172 See Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948) (jurisdiction-stripping provision did not block court from determining
whether statute deprived rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment); see also United States
v. California, 932 F.2d 1346, 1347–48 (9th Cir. 1991), aff’d on other grounds, 507 U.S. 746
(1993) (”[A[n appellate court may review an issue “neglected below if the issue is purely one
of law and the pertinent record has been fully developed, . . . [or] when there are significant
questions of general impact”). See generally Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for
Judicial Decisionmaking: Limitations from Jurisdictional Primacy and Intrasuit Preclusion,
63 FLA. L. REV. 301, 316–18 (2011) (citing Dan B. Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing
the Issue of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 MINN. L. REV. 491, 494–
99 (1967)) (observing that doctrine accepts as a bootstrap principle the rule that a court
without jurisdiction has power to determine whether it has jurisdiction).
173 Although the argument has fallen out of favor, an analogy might be drawn to the
constitutional-fact doctrine developed in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), which
requires an Article III court to review de novo findings of fact as well as conclusions of law
that pertain to constitutional rights. The alternative, the Supreme Court explained, would be
“to sap the judicial power as it exists under the federal Constitution, and to establish a
government of a bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever fundamental rights
depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes in
effect finality in law.” Id. at 57; see Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 229, 258 (1985) (stating that “I would be startled to see the Court decide that
a litigant pressing a bona fide constitutional claim could be denied access to the independent
judgment of a judicial forum. Nevertheless, I confess considerable uncertainty over whether
the Constitution generally mandates any specific level of independent judicial factfinding”).
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IV. NIT-PICKING TECHNICALITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL
AVOIDANCE, AND STATUTORY HOUSEKEEPING
It could be that Jackson is what Justice Powell might call—as he did
in Logan—“an isolated example of bureaucratic oversight”—precisely
the “sort of negligence . . . to toll the statutory period” for filing suit. 174
Or it could be that many letters of denial are returned, and the
administrative system for reviewing tort claims requires serious revision
and overhaul. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals did not engage that
question, and the United States does not publish statistics about the
number of FTCA denial-letters returned to the investigating agencies as
undeliverable. By reading the timely filing requirement as mandatory
and jurisdictional, the appeals court declined to take the sensible
approach of equitably tolling plaintiff’s claim and instead cast procedural
blame on the plaintiff and her lawyers. This Part makes two additional
points: (1) in future litigation, the United States ought to interpret its
waiver of immunity as requiring actual and timely notice to claimants;
and (2) in the spirit of “statutory housekeeping,” Congress ought to
clarify the terms of the FTCA waiver to prevent the recurrence of the
arbitrary injustice of the Jackson case.175 This Part addresses each of these
points in turn.
A. Constitutional Avoidance
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance holds that “where an
otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of
Congress.”176 The doctrine traditionally has been defended as a principle
of constitutional restraint that enables the judiciary to avoid unnecessary
friction with the political branches, recognizing the exceptional nature of
judicial review in a system that depends on majoritarian decision174

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 443 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
See Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter W. Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1417, 1421 (1987) (recommending “statutory housekeeping” to resolve problems and
conflicts in statutory interpretation).
176 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988) (citation omitted); see also Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[W]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn
in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided”).
175
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making.177 Critics question whether the doctrine in fact promotes judicial
restraint; in practice, the canon may enable courts to displace legislative
policies with judicial preferences in cases that are not constitutionally
warranted.178 Others see the doctrine’s normative value in terms of a
“resistance norm,” that is—“a rule designed to push interpretation in
directions that reflect enduring public values,” and those values stem
from constitutional provisions including Article III and the Due Process
Clause.179 The avoidance doctrine ought not to apply when it would
produce “a futile result, or an unreasonable result inconsistent with the
purpose of the statute.”180
Here, the FTCA comfortably supports a reading that the time period
for filing suit cannot commence until the certified or registered receipt
confirming that the claimant actually received the denial-notice has been
returned to the agency. Otherwise the use of certified or registered mail
is mere surplusage and makes no sense—use of regular postal service
would have been sufficient if mailing, without an assurance of the
claimant’s receipt, is all that Congress required. This reading of the
statute avoids a constitutional difficulty for it aligns congressional intent
with the requirements of due process. Congress enacted the FTCA to
provide a waiver of immunity of the most “sweeping” sort; the decision
to amend the statute in 1966 and to mandate administrative exhaustion
was intended to obviate the need for litigation by ensuring an early and
informal process that could investigate and attempt to settle the claim, not
to curtail access to federal courts.181 It was recognized that delay of
payment, which litigation inevitably involved, could be harmful to
individuals who had already suffered because of the government’s
negligent misconduct. At the same time, Congress made clear that those
who were dissatisfied with the agency’s disposition—in many cases,
claimants who believed that discovery would enable them to make a
better case for damages—could proceed to federal court in an orderly
177 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998) (explaining that
the canon “seeks to minimize disagreement between the branches by preserving congressional
enactments that might otherwise founder on constitutional objections”).
178 Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 74 (1995).
179 Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation
of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1551 (2000).
180 William M. Wiecek, The Debut of Modern Constitutional Procedure, 26 REV. LITIG.
641, 653 (2007).
181 Robert E. Lewis, Litigation under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 27 TEX. L. REV. 807,
807 (1949).
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way, and were to be given notice of their procedural rights.182 The
administrative procedures that Congress set out, and the Office of the
Attorney General elaborated upon in its regulations, were designed to
facilitate an easy disposition of claims, not to create “snarls” or proverbial
traps for the unwary.183
Over the years, a misplaced focus on strictly construing the
government’s waiver has transformed these claims-processing rules into
“nit-picking” jurisdictional requirements, so that deviation from the
prescribed rules now forms the basis for dismissing a claim. Although
some commentators criticize the avoidance doctrine as being subversive
of legislative prerogative, its application here would promote, not
undermine, congressional intent; it would serve as a variant of the
“resistance norm” described by Ernest A. Young—“rules that raise
obstacles to particular governmental actions without barring those actions
entirely”—by screening out unconstitutional glosses that have been
imposed on the statute notwithstanding congressional purpose.184 At the
same time, use of the avoidance doctrine would promote judicial
independence by preventing the courts from being conscripted into
ratifying unconstitutional acts of the other branches.185
It is not unusual for courts to use an avoidance principle when
assessing the constitutionality of statutes regulating federal jurisdiction.
A classic example is Webster v. Doe, a suit by a former CIA employee
challenging his termination. The government moved to dismiss for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction on the ground that judicial review was
barred by the authorizing statute.186 The Court read the statute to ensure
access to at least one judicial forum for constitutional claims, even if
jurisdiction did not exist under the statute for non-constitutional claims.187
182

See generally Bermann, supra note 7, at 579 (describing 1966 amendments).
The Federal Tort Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534, 540 (1947) (discussing aspects of the
FTCA that could potentially entangle unwary claimants in intricate legal snarls).
184 See Ernest A. Young, supra note 179, at 1551; see also Gilliam E. Metzger & Trevor
W. Morrison, The Presumption of Constitutionality and the Individual Mandate, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1715, 1719 (2013) (“[T]he modern avoidance canon is a tool of both statutory
construction and constitutional implementation. Indeed, it renders statutory construction a
mode of constitutional implementation.”).
185 See generally Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Does Avoiding Constitutional Questions Promote
Judicial Independence?, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1031 (2006) (discussing the relationship
between avoidance techniques and judicial independence).
186 Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
187 Id.
183
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Webster reflects a typical application of the avoidance doctrine when a
congressional statute purports to oust the courts of jurisdiction to hear
constitutional claims. In many of these cases, the argument that Article
III or the Due Process Clause mandates a federal forum faces “formidable
objection,” yet there is sufficient constitutional uncertainty to warrant
avoidance of the constitutional question or to counsel in favor of
protecting a constitutional norm through statutory interpretation.188 The
constitutional defect in withholding timely notice is straightforward. By
acknowledging that the FTCA requires meaningful, and not meaningless,
notice, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance would support the norm
of equality and due process while opening up a pathway for the judicial
resolution of tort claims on their merits. This article invites the United
States to embrace this reading of the statute in its future defensive
litigation.
B. Statutory Housekeeping
Finally, this article urges Congress and the Office of the Attorney
General to undertake what Justice Ginsburg has characterized in an
analogous context as “statutory housekeeping,” and to clarify that the
claims-processing rules of the FTCA are not jurisdictional.189 The FTCA
currently is codified in scattered provisions of the Part 28 of the United
States Code, and although the jurisdictional provisions are segregated
from those dealing with the administrative process, it appears that
additional clarification is needed to underscore that these latter provisions
are not freighted with jurisdictional significance but rather are affirmative
defenses that go to the merits and may be waived or equitably tolled. 190 A
generation ago, the Governance Institute aimed to increase
communication between Congress and the courts to improve statutory
drafting; the aim was to establish a mechanism for informing law makers
“about how appellate courts interpret the legislative product,” so that
technical defects, such as errors in grammar, infelicitous phrasing, or
verbal gaps and “glitches,” did not produce unintended and unfortunate
188

Ernest A. Young, supra note 179, at 1585–89.
Ginsburg & Huber, supra note 175, at 1428; see also Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in
Lawmaking—Judges Who Can’t and Legislators Who Won’t, 63 COL. L. REV. 787, 794 (1963)
(discussing problems of legislative drafting).
190 See Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, Title IV, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (current version
codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. §1346(b) (jurisdiction conferred); § 2401(b)
(jurisdiction exclusions); & §§ 2671–2680 (administrative exhaustion)).
189
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legal consequences.191 Conceptually, the project’s goal was to “promote
understanding” among the different branches of government, again with
the practical aim of enhancing the judiciary’s ability to interpret
legislation and leading to more effective governance.192 The project
involved a feedback mechanism: appellate courts would “transmit
opinions that point out possible technical problems in statutes to Congress
for its information and for whatever action it wishes to take.” 193 The
proposal eventually acquired institutional form, attracted the
participation of many appeals courts, and drew praise from legislators for
invigorating inter-branch communication.194
In a similar spirit, in previous writing I have urged that Congress
look to dismissed FTCA cases as a source of information about agency
performance and the possible need for regulatory reforms.195 Jackson
provides Congress with important feedback on how agencies process
federal-tort claims and offers insight about how claims-processors
apprehend their statutory and constitutional role—reflecting a serious
misunderstanding of the duty to provide meaningful notice when a claim
is denied.196 Further, Jackson underscores the importance of having
Congress review statutory language in the light of judicial canons, so that
courts can faithfully apply our nation’s laws consistent with
congressional goals.197
191 Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, A Mechanism for “Statutory
Housekeeping”: Appellate Courts Working with Congress, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 131,
131 (2007); see Robert A. Katzmann & Russell R. Wheeler, Interbranch Communication: A
Note on “Article III En Banc,” 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 110, 112 (2007).
192 See Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 682–83 (2012).
193 Katzmann & Wheeler, Interbranch Communication: A Note on “Article III En Banc,”,
supra note 191, at 111; see also Frank Burk, Statutory Housekeeping: A Senate Perspective,
85 GEO. L.J. 2217, 2218 (1997) (discussing the voluntary nature of congressional-committee
participation).
194 Katzmann, supra note 191, at 687–93 (discussing the “virtues” of the project and its
positive effects on governance).
195 See Helen Hershkoff, Early Warnings, Thirteenth Chimes: Dismissed Federal-Tort
Suits, Public Accountability, and Congressional Oversight, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1
(forthcoming Winter 2015).
196 Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712 (6th Cir. 2014).
197 Thirty years ago, the Administrative Conference of the United States examined agency
procedure under the FTCA and suggested a package of reforms that it believed would protect
against unreasonable interpretation and application of rules, promote efficient claimprocessing, and encourage fairness to claimants. Some of those reforms were never
implemented, and it is timely to do so. Drawing from the work of the Administrative
Conference, George M. Bermann identified specific changes to the claims-processing rules
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V. CONCLUSION
Commentators invoke the word “dysfunction” to describe a great
deal of current government activity, although the causes and cures of that
dysfunction are contested.198 Mark A. Graber writes, “Constitutional
dysfunctions occur when constitutional purposes, constitutional
institutions, and the constitutional culture are misaligned or
disharmonic.”199 Jackson offers a small window into the large problem
of dysfunction: the misalignment of the ancient principle of sovereign
immunity, if there even was such an ancient principle, with the
democratic principle of government accountability. No one entrusted
with power should think it reasonable to treat a letter returned to an
agency as affording the meaningful and timely notice that an individual
needs to enforce rights against the government; the fact that the
conditions are attached to a waiver of immunity—intended to secure
accountability—exacerbates rather than blunts the problem.200 If this
article motivates Congress, the courts, and government lawyers to rethink
their approach in FTCA cases, then it will have succeeded in modestly
realigning constitutional values with public action.

that warrant fresh consideration. See Bermann, supra note 7, at 579.
198 See Sotorios A. Barber, On Political and Constitutional Dysfunction, 94 B.U. L. REV.
603, 609 (2014) (“[C]onstitutional reform is remotely likely in the United States, at least not
until some calamity forces it upon the nation”); Nancy L. Rosenblum, Governing Beyond
Imagination: The “World Historical” Sources of Democratic Dysfunction, 94 B.U. L. REV.
649, 649 (2014) (“Democratic dysfunction is no illusion.”).
199 Mark A. Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and
Mending a Dysfunctional Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 620 (2014).
200 See Lawson, supra note 2, at 206 (arguing that certain forms of jurisdiction-regulation,
unless subject to constitutional limit, would allow Congress to dictate the outcome of the case
and would permit Congress to be the judge in its own cause).

